If we continue to assume that the supply of capital is fixed, but permit the labor supply curve to be upward sloping, perfect substitution between unskilled immigrant and native workers implies that the total volume of employment of unskilled workers will be unchanged. Some unskilled native workers will exit the labor market (either moving to another labor market or ceasing to participate) due to lower wages. So, in the short-run it's possible for the labor force participation rate and the employment-population ratio of unskilled workers to decline with an increase in immigration.
When we consider a period of time sufficient for the adjustment of capital, an expansion in the number of unskilled immigrants will have no effect on the wages or employment of native workers. The increase in the supply of capital will raise the wages of unskilled workers and skilled workers and lower the rate of interest on capital. There will be a recovery in the labor force participation rate of unskilled native workers. Once capital has had the opportunity to adjust, the wage rate of skilled and unskilled workers, the rate of interest capital, the employment and labor force participation rate of native workers return to their pre-immigration levels.
If unskilled native and immigrant workers are complementary factors, then there are other forms of wage inequality that will emerge in the shortrun -though they will not hold in the long run. In this case, the average wage of unskilled native workers will increase with an expansion in the supply of unskilled immigrants. Hence, in the short run there will be an expansion in native-immigrant wage inequality. Further, the expansion in the supply of unskilled immigrant workers will have a negative effect on the wages of pre-existing immigrants of the same ancestral groups.
Unraveling the effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of African
Americans has proven to be a formidable and to date an unsettled empirical chore. This paper critically assesses the empirical evidence on the relationship between immigration and African American labor market outcomes. Section I presents detailed descriptive statistics on changes in immigration and the labor market status of African Americans during 1994 -2012. Section II presents a review of the literature which empirically examines the relationship between immigration and African American employment. Our conclusions and discussion are presented in Section III. We find that for African Americans as a whole, immigration may have little effect on mean wages and probability of employment. However, there is some evidence that immigration may have had an adverse impact on the labor market outcomes of persons belonging to low education-experience groups.
I. Labor Market Characteristics of Immigrants and Native Workers
The data are taken from the Annual Social & Economic Study, Current Population Survey (March CPS), 1994 -2012. The CPS is a household survey of civilian, noninstitutionalized, adults (persons at least 15 years of age).
1 Our sample includes only workingage persons, that is, individuals 16 -64 years of age during the year of the survey. Throughout this paper "African American" and "black" are used interchangeably for Non-Hispanic African American. Similarly, "white" is shorthand for Non-Hispanic white. Most Hispanics in the CPS are self-described as white, while some are self-described as black. Per the CPS usage, Hispanics (or Latinos) are an ethnic category rather than a racial category; hence, "Hispanic" will include both blacks and whites. [ Table 1 ]
Much of the literature on the effects of immigration on labor market outcomes of native workers has focused on males. Accordingly, Figures 2 -4 present important labor market outcomes for native African American males: employment-population ratio, mean weekly workhours, and mean weekly wages for 1994-2012. Each outcome provides a sharp contrast with the long term increase in the immigrant share of the US labor force.
The canonical neoclassical model of immigration predicts a negative relationship between native wages and increases in immigration in the short-run, as well as a negative relationship between native participation and employment and increases in immigration in the short-run. Wages, employment, and participation did not decline in the 1990s as the immigration share of the labor force increased. Instead, the African American male employment-population ratio rose from 64 percent to 71 during 1993 -1999, while mean weekly workhours increased by 2 hours from 30.6 to 32.6 during the same period -a 6.5 percent increase in weekly workhours.
Mean wages of African American males rose from about $702 in 1993 to $866 percent in 2002.
[Insert Figures 2 -4]
The labor market outcomes of African American males did decrease during the 2000s, but this was a period of much slower immigration than during the 1990s. Rather than immigration, the recessions of 2001-2002 and 2007-2009 appear to the primary factors pulling down the employment, participation, and wages of African American males. 1994 -2001 , 2002 -2007 , 2008 -2012 . The transition years, that is, 2001 -2002 and 2007 the onset of recessions and the beginning of recoveries. Investment spending falls rapidly during recessions and rises rapidly during recoveries; hence, the transition years represent periods of rapid capital adjustment and provide a natural demarcation of the short-run versus the long-run.
Per the canonical neoclassical model of immigration, we would expect the coefficients of Table   2 to be zero. The "all arrivals" coefficients for employment and participants are not zero, but they are small. The "all arrivals" coefficients for the wage equation are large and have the wrong side.
[Insert Table 2] The short-run effects of immigration are associated with the most recent arrivals, while the long-run effects of immigration are associated with the most distant arrivals. Hence, the coefficients should be negative and decreasing in absolute value as we move from 1990s arrivals to pre-1965 arrivals (LaLonde and Topel, 1989 American workers are in this education group (Table 3) .
[Insert Table 4 ]
For senior workers, that is, persons 51 to 64 years of age, immigrants are less than or equal to 10 percent of the labor force for persons with at least 12 years of education. For young and middle age workers, the immigrant share is about 10 percent to 16 percent for high school graduates and is 13 percent for persons with a graduate degree. The pattern of immigrant shares suggests that to the extent that immigration has a significant effect on employment and wages, the effects will be greatest for high school dropouts and high school graduates (persons with only 12 years of education), especially for prime-age workers. For 2001-2010, we note then that Table   1 shows that 59 percent of native African American male workers and 54 percent of native African American female workers are within the education groups facing the highest immigration shares.
II. Immigration and African American workers
All other things equal, a large influx of low-skill immigrants will put downward pressure on the wages and employment opportunities of low-skill native workers. But, with a large influx of immigrants all other things are not equal. A large influx of immigrants also represents an increase in both the nation's productive capacity and aggregate demand. Some of the immigrants and their children will enroll in schools and colleges and thus increase the demand for education services. As an expansion in population, immigrants will also increase the demand for housing and thereby raise the income and wealth of native land owners, landlords, and construction companies. Immigrants also increase the demand for food and retail services, thereby increasing the demand for workers in these industries. Immigrants bring detailed knowledge of foreign market needs and opportunities and thus may have a positive effect on exports. A large expansion in immigrants will increase the demand for public services and expand tax revenue (Kerr and Kerr, 2011) . In short, establishing the short-and long-term labor market effects on low-skill native workers due to a large-scale expansion in the supply of low-skill immigrants is an empirical question: there is a negative substitution effect and a positive aggregate demand effect. (See Friedberg and Hunt 1995 and Borjas 2009 for summaries of the theory of immigration on domestic factors of production). Grossman (1982) , using data drawn from the 1970 Census, concluded that the effects of immigration on native employment and wages "do not pose serious economic threats to natives, although the effects are not negligible." Friedberg and Hunt (1995) conclude that in most empirical studies "a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants in the population reduces native wages by at most 1 percent." Furthermore, they conclude, "There is no evidence of economically significant reductions in native employment (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995:42) ." Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2009) perform a meta-analysis using 165 estimates collected from 9 empirical works (3 US and 6 European) that estimate the employment effects of immigration. Longhi, et al. (2009) is with natives. Their conclusion that the effects of immigration on native wages are "statistically significant but quantitatively small" is reflective of the majority of the studies that examine this issue.
Natural and policy experiments
Card ( Card's results are counter-intuitive. The Mariel boatlift (May 1980 -September 1980 occurred during a mild recession and a very deep recession followed soon thereafter. Recessions hurt employment and wages and provide the incentive and opportunity to replace domestic workers with presumably cheaper immigrant workers.
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Card asks, "How is it possible that a 7 percent exogenous increase in the labor supply has no effect on the wages, participation, and employment of both Cubans and Non-Cubans?" Card For example, as other Cuban workers were separating from textile and apparel manufacturing the workers hired to replace them may have been disproportionately members of the Mariel boatlift.
Card presents no evidence to confirm this particular speculation, only that it is consistent with the absence of a Mariel effect on wages, participation, and employment rates of blacks, whites, Cubans, and other Latinos.
Card does not discuss a third possibility: a large influx of immigrants represents both an increase in labor supply and an expansion in demand, via private consumption and investment spending as well as governmental purchases of goods and services. Marielitos' demand for food, housing, clothing, medical care, education, etc. represented an expansion in the size of local economy. As refugees, Marielitos were entitled to federal assistance in education, housing, health care, food stamps, other general welfare assistance, and a multitude of services of local, federal, and state employees. During the midst of a recessionary period, the exogenous increase in the labor supply was accompanied by an exogenous (and very large) increase in local spending and that had positive effect on employment. By contrast, low income immigrantsespecially undocumented immigrants, from countries other than Cuba are unlikely to have similar spending capacity.
The state of Alabama is currently 30 months after the initiation of a policy experiment via major changes in the state's policies regarding undocumented workers. In particular, Alabama has adopted a legal regime that makes it exceptionally difficult for undocumented persons to reside, work, attend school, or engage in business in the state. On June 9, 2011 Alabama Governor Robert J. Bentley signed into law HB 56, the Hammon-Beason Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.
Immediately upon signing, the law authorized the state to hire additional personnel to train police officers for implementing this act and for interacting with federal authorities. Most provisions of the Act and the associated criminal penalties went into effect September 1, 2011. These provisions include the following items: undocumented persons cannot enroll, attend, or receive any benefit from a public postsecondary education institution; it is unlawful for undocumented workers to apply for work at a public or private employer or work as an independent contractor; it is unlawful to pick up for hire workers on a street; "where reasonable suspicion exists," law enforcement officers may inquire of the citizenship and immigration status of persons that have been legally stopped, detained, or arrested; it is unlawful for individuals or institutions to assist undocumented persons in avoiding detection by law enforcement officers and it is illegal to encourage undocumented persons to enter Alabama, where the penalties for violating this provision may include forfeiture of property; it is unlawful to rent to an undocumented person; compensation of any kind paid to undocumented workers are not allowed as a deductible business expense; businesses or other organizations hiring an undocumented worker over legal workers are guilty of discrimination or businesses laying off a legal workers and keeping an undocumented worker are guilty of discrimination; contracts signed with undocumented workers are not valid; every public elementary and secondary school in Alabama (PK through grade 12) must ascertain the nativity and citizenship status of every student.
As intended, the law has driven undocumented workers out of Alabama. Addy (2012) estimates that the law has encouraged an exodus of 40,000 -80,000 undocumented workers from the state of Alabama. The law also has had severe unintended consequences, as the Alabama legislators ignored the state-level effects of a major reduction in aggregate demand.
Addy assumes that these workers would have annual earnings of $15,000 -$35,000 and most of these workers are employed in four industries: agriculture -crop and animal production (13.9 percent); construction (40.9 percent); accommodation (4.8 percent); and, food services and drinking places (40.5 percent). Next, Addy uses multipliers from the Regional Input-Output
Modeling System (RIMS II), U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, to derive income and employment effects associated with the flight of undocumented workers. 
Local labor market
Altonji and Card (1991) present a local market analysis of the impact of immigration on less-skilled workers, where the standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) is defined as the local market. An influx of immigrants into a city represents an expansion of the local labor supply. Native and immigrant workers are not separate factors of production; rather, workers are either unskilled or skilled and there is a down-sloping demand curve for each skill group of workers. At least some locally produced output is sold locally. New immigrants will increase the demand for local output, along with the derived demand for skilled and unskilled labor. If all locally produced output is locally sold and immigrants have the same unskilled-skill proportion as natives, the wage rates will be constant, but output, employment, and consumption will be higher in the local market. In the Altonji and Card theoretical model, the net impact of immigration depends upon a complex balance of forces: elasticity of labor supply, elasticity of labor demand in response to changes in own and other skill group's wage, the proportion of skilled and unskilled native workers, the proportion of skill and unskilled workers in the influx of immigrants, and the fraction of local output sold in the local labor. The estimate of the mean age and education adjusted labor market outcome for each SMSA (α j ) is saved and regressed against the SMSA's immigrant population share (M/P), the natural logarithm of the SMSA's population (lnP), mean age of race-sex group N in SMSA j, and mean education of race-sex group N in SMSA j.
(2) i αˆ= γ 0 + γ 1 (M/P) j + γ 2 lnP j + γ 3 Age Nj + γ 1 Education Nj + v To eliminate SMSA unobserved fixed effects, Altonji and Card also estimate a difference model,
Further, it may be the case that E(e|∆(M/P)) ≠ 0. Specifically, immigrants may be attracted to cities where there is already an enclave of members of their own ethnic group and to cities with favorable labor market conditions. Hence, they instrument the immigrant share by regressing ∆(M/P) against the fraction of immigrants in the SMSA in 1970 and obtain
Equation (4) is Altonji and Card's preferred model and γ 1 is the coefficient of interest.
For the pool data model, Altonji and Card find that a 10 percent increase in the immigrant share of an SMSA's population has the following effects:
a negative but insignificant effect on the labor force participation rate; a positive but insignificant effect on the employment-population ratio; a positive and significant effect on the employment rate (2.31 percent); a negative and significant effect on the fraction of workers who worked at any time during the previous year (-2.46); a positive but insignificant effect on the natural log of weeks work; and, a large negative and significant effect on weekly earnings (0.94 percent).
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The pattern of results more or less holds across each of the sub-groups. Including native workers with a high school diploma lowers the absolute value of the immigrant share coefficients. Reed 
National labor market
Borjas (2003) and Aydemir and Borjas (2011) provide evidence that large scale immigration has lowered the wages and employment of native workers. The former study assumes that workers with similar levels of education but varying levels of experience are imperfect substitutes. Exploiting those differences, Borjas (2003) finds that a 10 percent increase in labor supply arising from immigration reduces the wage and employment rates (measured as mean fraction of weeks worked) and increases the incarceration rate of competing native African American workers by 2.5 percent, 5.9 percentage points, and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. The increase in criminal employment is not sufficient to absorb all of the decline in market employment. BGH do not examine the detailed allocation of leisure time, which in their framework would be the consumption of pure leisure, an increase in home production (for example, unemployed parents using the reduction in market time to assist their children in school work), increases in human capital production, or military enlistment. In any case, the BGH model predicts that an increase in immigrant labor supply will increase criminality, but reduce the wages, employment, and labor force participation of native African Americans.
The elasticity of substitution for native black and immigrant ( Given p ext , BGH estimate the following empirical model,
where for each social group (native black males and native white males) yext is alternatively the employment rate, natural logarithm of earnings, and the incarceration rate for a given educationexperience group, E is a vector of binary variables representing different levels of education American males with only a high school diploma, immigration can explain 2 percentage points of the 7.6 percentage point decline in weekly wages and 5 percentage points of the 10 percentage point decline in the employment rate, but none of the increase in the incarceration rate.
[Insert Table 5 ]
By comparison, immigration has little or no labor market or incarceration effects on African American males with some college or a college degree. Indeed, the labor market and incarceration effects for these groups have the wrong sign. For white males with some college, the BGH results show that immigration explains more than 82 percent of the decline in weekly wages. By comparison, immigration explains about 1/3 of the wage reduction of white male dropouts. Taken literally, immigrants are about equal substitutes for African American and white male dropouts and high school graduates, but immigrants are complements for African American males with some college and substitutes for white males with some college. This may be correct, but it requires additional empirical exploration and explanation.
III. Summary and discussion
What do we know? There is a consensus that highly educated immigrants tend to have a positive impact on the wages and employment of nearly all native workers. Therefore, the empirical literature is often interested in the impact of less educated immigrants on less educated to 2001, weekly wages, weeks worked, weekly workhours, and labor force participation were increasing for African American women with at least 12 years of education. There was not as much progress for African American with less than 12 years of education. We were unable to locate research that has reconciled changes in the labor market status of African American women with the growth in the immigrant share of the labor force.
Microeconometric concerns
Thus far, the empirical literature seeking to establish the impact of immigrant workers on the labor market outcomes of native African Americans has not incorporated an important element of heterogeneity among native workers; namely, labor market "movers" and "stayers"
have different unobserved characteristics. To the extent that movers into labor markets are more positively selected than stayers, then movers will have superior labor market outcomes. The movers may be migrants or immigrants. For example, both Butcher (1994) and Model (2008) find that Afro-Caribbean immigrants have higher earnings than native stayers, but there are no wage or employment differences for recent immigrants and recent native movers.
Failure to account for unobserved heterogeneity among movers and stayers creates two problems: error-in-variables for the dependent variable and omitted variable bias. The former will increase standard errors and thereby reduce the likelihood of rejecting the null hypothesis, while the latter yields incorrect standard errors and biases upward the coefficient on the immigrant share variable (assuming that there is a positive correlation between immigrant share and the fraction of movers in a market). Hence, the dependent variable has to calculate native wages and employment for a given education-skill group, for time t, and for mover-stayer status.
Alternatively, a mover-stayer variable with appropriate interactions should be included among the explanatory variables.
There is a second specification problem. Except for Stewart and Hyclak (1986) , immigrant employment percentage is not separated by race, though wage, employment, and By not decomposing the immigrant share variable, BGH assume a differential labor market process for native black workers but an undifferentiated labor market process for foreignborn black workers. Consider a modified version of BGH's empirical model.
where the subscripts indicate black (b), white (w), Hispanic (h), and Asian (a). If this is the correct specification, BGH implicitly assume θ b = θ w = θ h = θ a , which assumes a racially undifferentiated labor market process for all immigrants. In the absence of a racially differentiated labor market process, there is no need to run separate equations for black and whites. Also, blacks should be Non-Hispanic blacks and whites should be Non-Hispanic whites. 10 In any case, the immigrant employment share variable must match the race of the outcome variables.
Third, BGH's empirical results do not match the long-run predictions of the canonical neoclassical model. The theory indicates that there are no long-run immigration effects on the wage and employment levels of native workers. Immigration effects are confined to changes in the distribution of wages and employment: the negative impact of immigration on low education workers has to be matched by a positive impact on high education workers.
Four, both Card (2001) and LaLonde and Topel (1989) Five, production is both a technical activity and a social activity (Mason, 1995 and 1999) .
Immigrants and natives who are perfect technical (skill) substitutes are not necessarily perfect social substitutes. Whether or not natives and immigrants are social substitutes depends on the managerial strategy of firms, which is not homogeneous across firms. Firms may care about the social composition of their labor force, e.g., the racial, ethnic, nativity, gender composition, for a variety of reasons other than skill that are related to the profitability of operations. For example, some firms have a managerial strategy based on low wage costs and poor working conditions (to compensate for inferior technology or other non-competitive conditions). Such firms rely on close management practices to extract effort from workers. Other firms have a managerial strategy based on high wages and excellent working conditions to extract effort from workers.
Such firms do not rely on close management of workers. For both types of firms, changes in the social composition of the workforce may have an actual or perceived impact on the efficiency of a particular managerial strategy. We are unaware of any immigration study that has sought to examine the empirical significance of the social composition of the workfoce.
Macroeconomic concerns
It is an open question as to whether the empirical models measuring the relationship between native worker labor market outcomes and immigrant share have truly captured a causal relationship. Immigrant share of the labor force has been rising along with an increasing globalization of the US economy. Import penetration of national goods and services, off-shoring of employment, and a rising immigrant share of employment may be causally connected series.
If so, it is not clear that a statistically significant relationship between immigrant share of the workforce and native worker employment ratio is sufficient to establish a causal relationship.
Immigration studies by labor economists usually assume a single output and fixed output price; hence, an increase in relative factor supplies (relative increase of unskilled labor because Increases in the employment of immigrants in the US may be correlated with decreases in the employment of native workers due to loss of market share to trading partners. For example, an increase in the employment of Mexican immigrants in one US industry may be matched by a reduction in employment of native workers in another industry due to increasing competitiveness of trading partners. Yet, it also seems reasonable that when we simultaneously consider both trade and labor market approaches to understanding the wage and employment effects of immigration, immigration will keep the labor market "pretensions of [native] workers in check." 11 Large scale immigration does represent an expansion in labor supply and neither the law of one price nor the law of demand has been repudiated. But, the lower wage trend presumably stimulates the growth rate of production, which picks up more workers than it would otherwise. Immigration may inhibit technological change, which would reduce the displacement of all workers. So, native workers would face more slowly growing real wages and more slowly growing employment, while immigrants will get higher wages than at home and also higher employment. It is however theoretically and empirically unclear whether the new relative extent of joblessness is higher or lower.
Import penetration is the production equivalent of immigration. Immigrants may be substitutes or complements for native workers, just as foreign products may be substitutes or equivalents for native products. Similarly, firms may transfer both the production of goods and services away from the US to another country, i.e., engaging in off-shoring. Hence, the effects of import penetration (or an increase in off-shoring) are likely analogous to the effects of immigration. From a policy perspective, placing a fence and guards at the border to stop immigration will not protect the labor market wellbeing of low wage workers -unless we are also simultaneously willing to reduce imports that are made by skill-equivalent workers and place capital controls on goods and services produced by low-wage workers. Closing the economy in the labor market creates greater pressure for openness in product and the capital markets; closing the economy in all markets creates unemployment. Stewart and Hyclak (1986) , but Stevan's estimation strategy has substantial econometric problems, viz., multicollinearity and endogenous explanatory variables.
9 They find that σ is very high. 50 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Table 3 , Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson, 2010. 
